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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
DESTRUCTIBILITY OF TERMS FOR YEARS: HABEAS CORPUS
AND CORAM NOBIS
IINiTRODUCTION
Underlying American criminal jurisprudence is an ever expanding principle
which may formally be called justice, but which more accurately should be termed
fairness to the individual defendant. As society and civilization have developed,
more and more has it been recognized that the person charged with a crime
should be protected in a real and substantial manner. However, until recently
New York was without a method to guarantee due process find fair treatment
to a person improperly imprisoned under a judgment. Many judgments were
defective because constitutional rights had been denied or fraud had been
practiced in the trial court. Habeas corpus could be used to release some per-
sons "illegally" imprisoned, but in many cases it showed a fatal defect. From
this dilemma, grew the New York coram nobis proceeding.
HABEAS CORPUS
The ancient writ of habeas corpus, forever enshrined in the Constitution,
has been, is now and probably always shall be cherished as the "great Palladium
of our liberty." This is because the writ has always offered a remedy to relieve a
person from illegal imprisonment by testing the jurisdiction of the authority
which presumes to imprison him. Thus a person confined under a commit-
ment by a magistrate to await grand jury action is entitled to the writ to test
a defect in that commitment;2 so, too is a person held under a defective in-
formation 3 or indictment.4 If the legality of the commitment is not questioned
habeas corpus may be used to establish the right to release on bail 5 or to re-
1. "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require It." U. S.
Const., Art. 1, §9. Also see N. Y. Const. §4 which reads: "The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or Invasion,
the public safety may require its suspension." Magna Charta contains the follow-
ing clause which was interpreted to insure the writ; "... no free man shall be
taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed except by the
lawful judgment of his peers by the law of the land." Thompson, Magna Charta,
Its Role in the Making of the English Constitution, 1300-1629, 87 (1948).
2. People ex tel. Calletti v. Morehead, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 78 (Sup. Ct 1944).
3. People ex rel. Farley v. Crane, 94 App. Div. 397, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 343 (1st
Dept. 1904); People v. Rapaport, 261 App. Div. 484, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 110 (2nd
Dept. 1941).
4. Habeas corpus attack on an indictment is extremely limited. People ex
rel. Childs v. Knott, 228 N. Y. 608, 127 N. E. 329 (1920); see also Boudin, Has the
Writ of Habeas Corpus been Abolished in New York, 35 Col. L. Rev. 850 (1935).
5. §1255 N. Y. C. P. A.
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duce extreme bail. 6 In certain cases the writ will afford immediate relief on
the claim of double jeopardy.7 It may be invoked to test a detention in ex-
tradition proceedings 3 or secure a prisoner's release from the excessive part of
his sentence.0 Even when a person is imprisoned by authority of a judgment
habeas corpus may be employed to collaterally inquire into the judgment's
legality. However, in such a case the actual inquiry under the New York
Habeas Corpus Act is limited to a narrow field.10 The first portion of the com-
ment will be devoted to the range of that inquiry.
The Jurisdictional Limit
The legislature has established certain procedures to maintain due process
safeguards after trial and conviction and yet promote system and finality in
criminal proceedings. They are the motion for a new trial," the motion for
arrest of judgment,'2 and appellate review.13 The common law has given us
6. People ex rel Deliz v. Warden, 260 App. Div. 155, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 435 (1st
Dept. 1946); People ex rel. Gagliano v. Warden, 188 Misc. 800, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 220
(Sup. Ct. 1947); People ex tel. Nuccio v. Warden, 182 Misc. 654, 45 N. Y. S. 2d
230 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
7. People ex rel. Stabile v. Warden, 202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 729 (1911);
People ex rel. Qstwald v. Carver, 272 App. Div. 181, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 513 (3rd Dept.
1947); cf. People ex rel. Herbert v. Hauley, 142 App. Div. 421, 126 N. Y. Supp. 840
(1st Dept. 1911); see also People ex. rel Hunt v. Warden, - Misc.,-- , 107
N. Y. S. 2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
8. People ex rel. Woloshin v. Warden, 197 Misc. 609, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 370
(Sup. Ct. 1950).
9. People ex rel. Kondrk v. Foster, 299 N. Y. 329, 87 N. E. 2d 281 (1949);
People ex rel. Thzornwell v. Heacox, 231 App. Div. 617, 247 N. Y. Supp. 464 (4th
Dept. 1931).
10. The New York Habeas Corpus Act (now Art. 77 of the N. Y. C. P. A.)
was passed shortly after the Revolution and embodied much the same limitation
as provided in §1231(2) of the N. Y. C. P. A. which makes the writ of habeas
corpus unavailable where the prisoner "... . has been committed or is detained by
virtue of the final judgment or decree of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal
jurisdiction." This statute is intended only to enforce the common law which
reserves to the courts the inherent power to determine competency or "whether
the court making the judgment or decree, or issuing the process, had legal and
constitutional power to give such judgment or send forth such process." People
ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 550, 570 (1875). A general definition of compe-
tency was established in Landers v. Staten Island R. Co., 53 N. Y. 450, 124
A. L. R. 1080 (1873). "Thus competency in a court, within the meaning of the
statute, is measured by its 'power' . . . "People ex rel. Fisher v. Morhous, 183
Misc. 51, 58, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 111, 116 (Sup. Ct. 1944). A petition under sec. 1234
of the N. Y. C. P. A. is fatally defective if a complete lack of competence is
not alleged as required by sec. 1231(2) ob. cit. supra. 10 Carm. 96; see also People
ex rel. Bailey v. McCann, 222 App. Div. 465, 226 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1st Dept. 1928).
11. §§462-466 N. Y. Code of Crim. Proc. Motion must be made before judg-
ment, except (1) where there is newly discovered evidence; then a motion may
be made within one year of judgment; (2) where the sentence is death the motion
may be raised anytime before execution. Ibid at §466.
12. §§467-470 N. Y. Code of Crim. "Proc. Motion must be made before
defendant is called for judgment Ibid at §469.
13. §§515-532 N. Y. Code of Crim. Proc. Appeal must be taken within
thirty days of judgment entry. Ibid. at §521.
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the motion to vacate judgment 14 and the writ of habeas corpus in order to
furnish additional due process insurance. Like the motion to vacate judgment,
the writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that was never intended
to impede the use of direct channels of relief. Yet, because it is a civil pro-
ceeding' 1 designed to inquire summarily into illegal detention' 0 it cuts directly
through appeal and the other remedial statutory provisions.17 Therefore it is
necessary to restrain habeas corpus so that it does not obstruct regular criminal
procedure without going so far as to keep the writ beyond the reach of those
illegally imprisoned.' 8 The solution of this problem was found in the jurisdic-
tional aspect inherent in the writ.19 The courts restricted the writ by giving the
word jurisdiction a very limited meaning, and in a habeas corpus proceeding
will only inquire into the trial court's jurisdiction to pronounce the particular
judgment. New York has accepted this historic limitation of habeas corpus
when it is employed to collaterally attack a judgment 20 But before the court
will even examine into the jurisdiction of the trial court it must be convinced
that other remedies are no longer available.21 Thus the court will dismiss the
14. This motion is more commonly referred to in New York as a coram nobis
proceeding, discussed, infra.
15. "Habeas corpus is not a remedy in a criminal action or proceeding or In
the nature thereof; but is a civil proceeding to inquire into the cause of restraint
or detention and to enforce a civil right to be released from restraint, custody or
confinement which is unlawful. . ." People ex rel. Childs v. Knot, 187 App. Dlv.
604, 176 N. Y. Supp. 321, 333 (1st Dept. 1919).
16. See §1230 N. Y. C. P. A.
17. At common law the writ of habeas corpus was considered to be In the
nature of a writ of review. 1 Holdsworth, Some Lessons From Our Legal History,
63-75. An annotation in 3 Hill 649 (1883) indicates the same feeling In New
York State: "It (habeas corpus) is a prerogative writ, not ministerally issuable,
i.e. not issuable of course; and yet it is a writ of right, on a proper foundation
being made out by proof . . . The proceedings on all prerogative writs are
appellate in their character looking to the case as it stands upon the return.
Hence the habeas corpus is said to be in the nature of a writ of error." See also
Chancellor Kent's remarks in Yates' Case, 4 Johns. 317, 360 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. of
Judic., 1809).
18. Lord Hardwicke enunciated the rather harsh principle behind the policy
when he said: "But here you apply to have the defendant discharged on the very
merits, but I think it would be a most dangerous consequence if we should allow
such proceedings; for then, all the prisoners in England would lay their cases
before us and we instead of the jury must try the truth of the fact for which
they are committed." Rex v. Parnam, Cun. 96 (1735).
19. Authority indicates that habeas corpus review has always been limited
to an examination of jurisdiction alone. "If commitment be against law, as being
made by one who had no jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter which by law
no man ought be punished, the courts are to discharge." Bacon Abr., Hab. Corp.,
B. 10. See also 2 Kent's Comm. 25 (14th ed., 1901); see Ex Parte Tobias Watkins,
3 Pet. 197, 202 (U. S. 1829 per Marshall, C. J.).
20. People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, supra, n. 10.
2L People ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 286 N. Y. 27, 35 N; E. 2d 636 (1941);
People v. Harrison, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (Co. Ct. 1946); a motion for new trial or
executive pardon were open to defendant who claimed to be an imbecile and
therefore habeas corpus was dismissed, People ex rel. Cassidy v. Lawes, 112 Misc.
257, 182 N. Y. Supp. 545 (Sup. Ct. 1920); motion for arrest of Judgment was
appropriate in People ex rel, Heins v. Hunt, 229 App. Div. 419, 242 N. Y. Supp.
105 (3rd Dept. 1930).
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writ if it believes appeal is available to correct the alleged defects.22 This rule
applies regardless of how faulty the judgment that causes the relator's imprison-
ment seems to be.23 The courts will by-pass appeal and grant immediate relief
only in "rare cases" where the facts are incontrovertable and manifestly indicate
the relator was improperly deprived of his liberty.24 When the court does re-
view the trial court's jurisdiction it determines only whether the trial court was
legally empowered to try the particular charge
25 against the particular person 1
before it. This is all the word jurisdiction connotes when habeas corpus scrutini-
zes a judgment.27 Defects bearing on other matters, including unconstitutional
aspects of the trial itself, will not be considered because the court can not go
further into the case after its jurisdictional test has been satisfied.2 8 But since
the judgment enjoys a presumption of jurisdiction, any fact may be proven by
common law evidence in a habeas corpus proceeding to show the trial court was
without jurisdiction and thus rebut.the presumption.2 9 If, however, a certain
fact establishing jurisdiction in the trial court has already been found by the
trial court the fact must stand until reversed upon direct review.30 Erroneous
and irregular conclusions of law or fact in the record must also be left to direct
review 31 unless they dearly indicate that the trial court lost or never had jurisdic-
tion over the crime or the person under any possible set of circumstances.
32
Thus it can be seen that habeas corpus was confined to a narrow area. Be-
cause of the limits of the writ, New York was placed in the position of being
without adequate due process safeguards.
22. People ex Tel. Holt v. Lambert, 237 App. Div. 39, 260 N. Y. S. 2d 678
(1st Dept. 1932) aff'd. without opin. 261 N. Y. 695, 185 N. E. 795 (1933). See
also People ex tel. Doyle 'v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921), writ of
error den., 261 U. S. 590(1923).
23. People ex tel. Scharff v. Frost, 198 N. Y. 110, 91 N. E. 376 (1910).
24. People ex tel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N. Y. 410, 80 N. E. 383 (1907); People
ex. tel Jannioky v. Warden, 231 App. Div. 131, 246 N. Y. Supp. 194 (2d Dept
1930); aff'd. 255 N. Y. 623, 175 N. E. 340 (1930); People ex Tel. Flinn v. Barr, 140
Misc. 422, 251 N. Y. Supp 116 (Sup. Ct. 1931); aff'd. 234 App. Div. 682, 252 N. Y.
Supp. 937 (1st Dept. 1931).
25. See People v. Hislop, 77 N. Y. 331 (1879), where there was no crime for
the trial court to adjudicate.
26. See People ex tel. Frey v. Warden, 100 N. Y. 20 (1895), where a military
tribunal was not allowed to imprison a civilian.
27. People ex Tel. Tweed v. Liscomb, supra, n. 10; People ex rel. Hubert v.
Kaiser, 206 N. Y. 46, 99 N. E. 195 (1912); People ex tel. Carr v. Martin, supra, n.
21; People en Tel. Bailey v. McCann, supra, n. 10.
28. People ex tel. Carr v. Martin, supra, n. 21; People ex tel. Fisher v.
Morhous, supra, n. 10.
29. People ex Tel. Tweed v. Liscomb, supra, n. 10;
30. In People ex tel. Scharif v. Frost, supra, n. 23 at 116, 91 N. E. at 378
this point was unchallenged in Judge Vann's dissent and established the rule in
New York.
31. People ex -rel. Todak v. Hunt, 153 Misc. 783, 275 N. Y. Supp. 115 (Co. Ct.
1934), aff'd. without opin 243 App. Div. 859, 279 N. Y. Supp. 720 (4th Dept. 1935);
Richardson en tel. Farnum, v. Collins, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
32. People ex Tel. Carr v. Martin, supra, n. 21.
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CORAM NOBIS
The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that a state is free
under the due process clauses to change criminal procedure, but a fair trial in
a court of competent jurisdiction must be had.3 3 In Mooney v. Holohan,34 how-
ever, the duty owed by a state under the Fourteenth Amendment to an accused
prisoner was more sharply defined. Mooney alleged that his conviction was ob-
tained by perjured testimony, knowingly used by the prosecution. He further
alleged that the prosecuting attorney had suppressed evidence which would have
tended to refute the evidence against him. The Supreme Court held that if
these allegations were proved, petitioner had been denied due process by
the state, and, further, the state was responsible for providing some sort
of corrective procedure whereby a prisoner would be afforded a fair and ad-
equate hearing on such allegations. Subsequently, the court ruled that due pro-
cess was also denied by a state when a defendant was not advised of his right
to counsel and was tricked into pleading guilty.35 Thus the states were made
to understand that the sanctity of a judgment rendered with jurisdiction was not
per se complete. The other elements of due process had to be satisfied.
The New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Lyons v. Goldstein 30, re-
cognizing that habeas corpus was inadequate, "created" the corrective procedure
called for. A prisoner alleged that his plea of guilty, entered some years before,
had been induced by fraud. He asked that the judgment of conviction be vacated
and that he be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not
guilty. The Court held: 1 N. Y. Code of Crim. Proc. §337, which allows a
withdrawal of a plea of guilty before judgment, should not be interpreted to pro-
hibit a withdrawal after judgment; 2. it cannot be doubted that a court has the
inherent power to set aside its own judgment if procured by fraud and mis-
representation; 3. such has been allowed in civil cases and no distinction should
be made between the power in civil cases and in criminal cases; 4. such a pro-
ceeding would be analogous to or in the nature of the common law writ of error
coram nobis, which was a post-judgment corrective procedureT
Coram nobis has been used in America as a means of collateral attack upon
judgments. It has been allowed where a plea of guilty was induced by fear of
33. Corwin, the Constitution and What It Means Today (10th ed. 1948).
34. 294 U. S. 103 (1934).
35. Smithb v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941). Right to counsel In a state
criminal proceeding is only demanded by the Supreme Court when "special cir-
cumstances" are shown. Cf. Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951), noted 1 Bflo.
L. Rev. (1952), this issue.
36. 290 N. Y. 219, 47 N. E. 2d 425 (1943).
37. The Writ of Error Quae Coran Nobis Resident (let the record and
proceedings remain before us), arose in England because only errors of law were
reviewable. See geneially, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 744 (1924); 39 Mich. L. Rev. 963
(1941); 24 C. J. S. sec. 1606, 1607.
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mob violence 3 s and where such a plea was made in ignorance of the meaning
of the plea.39 It was found to lie where a confession was obtained by duress 40
and where the defendant was insane at the time of the trial 4'
The states also engrafted certain limitations on the writ. Thus, California
found the writ not to lie where there might have been a motion for a new trial
or an appeal, even though the time limit for these remedies had elapsed.42 Nor
would the writ be entertained if the prisoner had any other adequate remedy at
law.
43
The writ, therefore, provided relief in many and varied circumstances ac-
cording to the law of the respective jurisdictions wherein it was used. Running
throughout the majority of the cases and expressions of the doctrine is a tone
indicating that competing interests are locked in mortal combat, viz. the interest
of protecting the rights of an individual accused of a crime and the interest of
having judgment become final at some point of time. Thus are explained hesita-
tions and technical dismissals of the writ. The Court of Appeals, by terming
the motion to vacate a criminal judgment a writ in the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis, obtained a highly elastic tool to fill the gap in the field of due pro-
cess left by limited habeas corpus, and obtained it free of bulky technicalities
and confusing precedents.
CORAM NOBIS IN NEW YORK TODAY
Preliminary
The Lyons case, supra, held that a court has the inherent power to vacate its
own judgment. Thus, a petitioner in New York may not challenge the validity
of a judgment of a court of another jurisdiction."4 Nor may he, within New
York, challenge the judgment of a county court in supreme court.45
The court entertaining the writ need not be one of record, for if the writ
was so limited, those denied due process in such courts would be without a
38. Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29 (1882); Nickels v. State, 86
Fla. 208, 98 So. 497 (1923).
39. Ernst v. State, 179 Wise. 646, 192 N. W. 651, 30 A. L. R. 681 (1923).
40. State v. Ray, 111 Kan. 350, 207 Pac. 192 (1922).
41. Adler v. State, 37 Ark. 517, 37 Am. Rep. 48 (1880). Missouri even
allowed the writ where the court found that the defendant was sentenced too
severely considering his minority. Ex Parte Gray, 77 Mo. 601 (1882).
42. People v. Peyson, 123 Calif. App. 346, 11 P. 2d 431 (1932).
43. Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N. E. 633 (1932).
44. People v. McCollough, 300 N. Y. 107, 89 N. E. 2d 335 (1949).
45. People v. Wurzler, 300 N. Y. 344, 90 N. E. 2d 886 (1950).
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remedy.46 For the same reason, a court becoming functus officio at the end of
each case may entertain the 'wri
7
Substance
Generally, a coram nobis proceeding will lie in New York when the peti-
tioner is confined under a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and:
1. the judgment was obtained in violation of the due process clauses of the State
or Federal Constitution;48 or 2. the judgment was obtained upon a mistake of
fact.49 Exact lines of delimitation as to the scope of the writ are not apparent as
yet, since the coram nobis proceeding is only nine years old in New York. How-
ever, relief has been granted in at least four types of cases and they afford the
basis for the widest use of the writ today.
Fraud in Procurement: A judgment procured by the practice of fraud upon the
court will be vacated. Consequently, where a plea of guilty was induced through
a misrepresentation by the prosecution5 0 or by the judge,51 the judgment may be
collaterally attacked.
Illegal Use or Suppression of Testimony: When the judgment has been procured
by the use of testimony known by the prosecution to be perjured, or testimony
favorable to the defendant has been suppressed, due process has been denied 2 If
the prosecution unwittingly uses perjured testimony it is not clear whether coram
nobis would lie. It has been held that credibility of witnesses is for the jury and
their credibility cannot be attacked collaterally.53 However, if it could be shown
that the star witness of the prosecution was lying and if the testimony of that
witness was necessary for conviction, it seems a resulting judgment would be
1. tainted by fraud exercised upon the court by the witness; or 2. entered upon
a mistake of fact unknown to the court at the time of entry. In either case, a
coram nobis proceeding should be proper.
Failure to Advise of Right to Counsel: New York statutory and constitutional law
provide that a defendant must be advised of his right to counsel when brought be-
46. Matter of Hogan v. Supreme Court, 295 N. Y. 92, 65 N. E. 2d 181 (1946).
47. Ibid.
48. Matter of Hogan v. Court of GeneraZ Sessions, 296 N. Y. 1, 68 N. E. 2d
349 (1946).
49. Matter of Lyons v. Ward, 272 App. Div. 120, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 715 (4th
Dept. 1947); aff'd. without opinion, 297 N. Y. 617, 75 N. E. 2d 630 (1947); af'd.,
334 U. S. 314 (1948).
50. Matter of Lyons v. Goldstein, supra, n. 36. People ex rel. Rose v. Addi-
tion, 189 Misc. 102, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1947). In this case the Insanlty of
the accused was fraudulently concealed from the court at the time of the plea
of guilty.
51. People v. Sullivan, 276 App. Div. 1087, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 266 (2d Dept.
1950).
52. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1934); Matter of Morhaus v. Supreme
Court, 293 N. Y. 131, 56 N. E. 2d 79 (1944).
53. People v. Fanning, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 65 (Co. Ct. 1947).
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fore a magistrate and counsel must be appointed for a prisoner if he has none and
desires the assistance of counsel 5 4 Due process is satisfied if the accused had
counsel on the day of sentencing, though he had none when he pleaded guilty. 5
The indigent prisoner does not, however, have the right to choose his own coun-
sel.5 But he is entitled to the conscientious service of adequate and competent
counsel The alleged incompetency can only be attacked successfully if it was such
as to deprive the defendant of "adequate legal representation" so as to make his
conviction a mockery of justiceW
Illegal Sentencing of Recidivist Felons: The New York Penal Law provides for
increased punishment of recidivist felons.5s Where a court has mistakenly
sentenced a prisoner as a recidivist, coram nobis will lie.59 Usually this
s;tuation will arise when a defendant has been previously convicted of a
crime in a foreign jurisdiction. The question then becomes, whether that
crime is a felony under New York law. In People v. Olah 0o it was held that the
statute upon which the indictment or information was drawn defines and
measures the crime. Only those facts necessary to be alleged to bring the indict-
ment or information within the foreign statute may be considered. If the foreign
crime so measured is a felony in New York, the recidivist statute applies.
Habeas corpus may also be used where the prisoner was incorrectly sentenced
as a recidivist.61 The Court of Appeals has not stated which of the two remedies
54. N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. §188, 308; N. Y. Const. art. 1, see. 6. It may be
noted that habeas corpus was used to attack this defect in 1939, People ex rel.
Moore v. Hunt, 258 App. Div. 24, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 19, 25 (4th Dept. 1939). The
theory was that the court was without jurisdiction because defendant was not
advised of this right. The Supreme Court of the United States has said that a
state court could lose jurisdiction during the course of a trial (for purposes of
the federal writ of habeas corpus), by actions offending due process. If that
doctrine would be true in New York today, habeas corpus could be used in many
situations where coram nobis is appropriate. However, the Court of Appeals in a
memorandum denying a motion to appeal said that habeas corpus is not the
proper remedy to attack the defect of non-advisement of counsel, People ex Tel.
Martine v. Hunt, 294 N. Y. 651, 60 N. E. 2d 384 (1945).
55. Canizio v. New York, 327 U. S. 82 (1946). But see People v. Guariglia,
303 N. Y. 338, 102 N. E. 2d 580 (1951). Defendant was first represented by counsel
on the day of sentencing. The appointed attorney seemingly did nothing for the
defendant. The Court of Appeals sent the case back for a hearing on the merits,
apparently feeling that the prisoner was not represented by competent counsel
and was not even consciously aware that he was being represented. See also
People v. Balestrier, 278 App. Div. 782. 103 N. Y. S. 2d 899 (1951).
56. People v. Fanning, supra, n. 53.
57. People v. De Bernardo, 199 Misc. 563, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 515 (Co. Ct. 1951);
People v. Smith, - Misc. , 108 N. Y. S. 2d 703 (Co. Ct. 1951).
58. Penal Law §§1941-1944.
59. People v. Mclollough, supra, n. 44; People v. Turpin, 277 App. Div. 1059
100 N. Y. S. 2d 878 (2d Dept. 1950); People v. Mcdowell, 200 Misc. 46, 105 N. Y. S.
2d 971 (Gen. Sess. Co.Ct.1951); People v. Huber, 194 Misc 586, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 239
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
60. 300 N. Y. 96, 89 N E. 2d 329 (1949). Prior to this case, the New York
courts looked to the definition of the offense under the foreign statute and to any
recital of facts in the indictment or information. See notes, 50 Col. L. Rev. 247
(1950), 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1448 (1950).
61. People ex Tel. Newman v. Foster, 297 N. Y. 27, 74 N. E. 2d 224 (1947).
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is proper.62 However, it seems that a coram nobis proceeding could be brought
at anytime after judgment, while habeas corpus would not lie until the prisoner
had commenced serving the illegal portion of the sentence. Until that time the
prisoner would be "confined under a judgment of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.' But since the court had no jurisdiction whatever to mete out the recidivist
portion, the prisoner could then commence his collateral attack.
Limits
Undoubtedly, when fraud has been practiced upon the court the judgment
may be vacated at any time. But in other areas where coram nobis applies, limits
have been effected. Thus, the motion only will be entertained when no other
corrective statutory process is or was available.63 If the alleged error was not
outside the record, the remedy is appeal, not coram nobis. 04 Hence, errors of
law are not reviewable under the writ.0 5 Where the issue was decided against
the defendant on appeal, coram nobis could not raise the same issue again.00
There is no statutory time limit on the writ. The Court of Appeals has
held that the writ can be brought at any time,67 and, probably, laches would not
apply
6 8
If a motion to vacate a judgment has been brought and dismissed, ordinarily
the motion cannot be renewed on the same grounds without permission of the
court.
6 9
A motion to dismiss an indictment on the grounds of insufficient evidence
must be made before conviction. Therefore, coram nobis is not available. 70 Again,
the writ cannot be used to attack an indictment on the basis of mere typographical
errors."
Burden of Proof
When a judgment of a court is attacked as invalid, the attacker is first met
62. Compare ibid with People v. Olah, supra, n. 60.
63. Matter of Hogan v. Court of General Sessions, supra, n. 48.
64. People ex rel. Jackson 'v. Harrison, 298 N. Y. 219, 227, 82 N. E. 2d 14, 18
(1948); People v. Gorney, - Misc.- , 103 N. Y. S. 2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
65. People v. Smith, supra, n. 57.
66. People v. Lemmons, 277 App. Div. 783, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 70 (2nd Dept. 1950).
67. People v. Richetti, 302 N. Y. 290, 298, 97 N. E. 2d 908, 912 (1951); Boji-
noff v. People, 299 N. Y. 145, 85 N. E. 2d 909 (1949).
68. People v. Richetti, supra, n. 67 at 912.
69. Bojinoff v. People, supra, n. 67.
70. People v. Wurzler, 278 App. Div. 783, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 818 (3rd Dept. 1951).
71. People v. Erhart, 197 Misc. 380, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 176 (Co. Ct. 1950),
incorrect dates.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
with the presumption of regularity of a judicial proceeding. 72 It has been held that
the burden is on the petitioner in a coram nobis proceeding to sustain his al-
legations by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence.73 Recently, however,
in People v. Richetti, 74 the Court of Appeals pointed out that a presumption
of regularity exists only until contrary substantial evidence appears. The peti-
tioner must go forward with the proof, but once he does go forward with sufficient
proof, the presumption is out of the case. A bald assertion by a prisoner that
he was denied his constitutional rights will not overcome the presumption.75 Nor
is the presumption to be dissipated "in an area of conjecture or expedient an-
swers" 70 and the evaluation of the evidence is for the court. 77 When an inference
of non-conformity is raised, the presumption of regularity disappears and the
burden is on the People to establish compliance.7s Unless the opposing papers
of the People conclusively show that the sworn allegations of the petitioner are
false, there must be a trial, for due process is only satisfied when a person is given
a hearing upon the merits before a competent tribunal where he may appear and
assert and protect his rights.79
Appeals, Res Judicata, Waiver
New York now provides that both the prisoner and the People may appeal
of right to the Appellate Division.8" Appeals to the Court of Appeals are only
allowed by certification of a judge thereof or of a justice of the Appellate
Division."' A petitioner whose application was denied when no appeal was
available may now renew his motion and take advantage of his right to appeal82
Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata will apply to coram nobis pro-
72. People v. Richetti, supra, n. 67; People v. Erhart, supra, n. 71.
73. People v. Shapiro, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 774 (Gen. Sess. 1947).
74. Supra, n. 67.
75. People v. Coger, 277 App. Div. "786, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 105 (2nd Dept. 1950);
app. dismissed, 302 N. Y. 599, 96 N. E. 2d 895 (1951).
76. People v. Lake, 190 Misc. 794, 796, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 352, 355 (Gen. Sess.
1948).
77. People v. Shapiro, supra, n. 73.
78. People v. De Bernardo, supra, n. 57.
79. People v. Richetti, supra, n. 67. The Richetti case was sent back to the
trial court and the petitioner convinced the court that the judgment was illegal,
People v. Richetti, - Misc.- , 109 N. Y. S. 2d 29 (Co. Ct. 1951). Where
the judge who rendered the judgment and the court stenographer are
dead, the courts have allowed public voluntary defenders serving in the courtat that time to testify that the invariable practice was that prisoners would be
asked if they desired counsel. If they did, counsel would be appointed. See
People v. Shapiro, supra, n. 73, and People v. Lake, supra, n. 76.
80. N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. H517-519. Before the right was given, the appellate
courts heard coram nobis cases on proceedings under Art. 78, N. Y. C. P. A.
81. People v. Hatzis, 297 N. Y. 163, 77 N. E. 2d 385 (1948).
82. People ex rel. Sedlak v. Foster, 299 N. Y. 291, 86 N. E. 2d 752 (1949).
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ceedings is not clear s3 Defendant will, however, be given only one day in court,
but that day must be complete and adequate.
84
The Supreme Court has held that a defendant has not been denied federal
due process if he had an opportunity to raise a defect upon a subsequent convic-
tion (e. g. when being sentenced as a recidivist).8
5 But if the federal right is
gone, the state constitutional right may still remain.8 0 To waive a constitutional
right under state law, the defendant must act understandingly, competently and
intelligently.87 Courts will not presume acquiesence in the loss of fundamental
rights and all reasonable presumptions against a waiver will be applied.
8
CONCLUSION
In the nine years since the Lyons case, there has been much speculation con-
cerning the scope of this new writ. For the most part, it will be used when no
other corrective procedure is available and when due process, justice or fairness
demands that the petitioner have a remedy. By approaching each fact situation
with an analytical attempt to determine whether the prisoner was at any time
given a full and adequate day in court as to the issues, intermixed with an eye
to fairness and justice, it will be seen that most cases reach a good result. Almost
without exception, the coram nobis rules boil down to the judgment of particular
fact situations, thereby leaving decision in the sound discretion of the courts.
Substance, not technicalities, will destroy an equipoise.
As in the past, the content of due process will be determined largely on the
basis of reasonableness. The courts in the future must take care in criminal pro-
ceedings to see that prisoners are treated with fairness and justice. Habeas corpus,
however still has a job to do, but where it is blocked, coram nobis will bridge the
gap and the judgment will be vacated. Thus the field of due process will be
adequately protected.
David J. Mahoney, Jr.
Thomas 1. Kelly
83. See Bojinoff v. People, supra, n. 67 (res judicata did not apply when the
defendant moved and was defeated before appeal was given, and thereafter moved
again on the same grounds). Also see People v. Gorney, supra, n. 64.
84. See People v. Martine, 278 App. Div. 966, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 673 (2nd Dept.
1951). The petitioner moved three times on the same facts. After the second
motion was denied, he filed an appeal, but failed to prosecute it. On the third
motion the court felt that Martine had had his day in court.
85. Gayes v. New York, 332 U. S. 145 (1947).
86. Bojinoff v. People, supra, n. 67.
87. ibid; People v. Guariglia, supra, n. 55.
88. People v. Riohetti, - M isc.-----, 109 N. Y. S. 2d, 29, 44 (Co.
Ct. 1951).
